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Dear colleagues and friends, 
 
I am most grateful for the opportunity to address you at this occasion on a subject 
that concerns both my work as President of the International Center for 
Transitional Justice and as Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the 
Prevention of Genocide.  Transitional Justice and Prevention of Genocide are new 
horizons of human rights protection.  Calling them “new horizons” is not intended 
to mean that they have not been always with us in terms of challenge and 
desirability: in fact, punishing those responsible for the Holocaust and for the war 
crimes of World War II, and preventing their recurrence were at the heart of efforts 
to create an international human rights canon in the late 1940s.  But they constitute 
“new horizons” in the sense that the human rights movement is only now 
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beginning to develop effective means and methods to make them a reality.  Of 
course, there are other “new horizons” in human rights protection, some of them 
quite dear to the founders, the faculty and the students of this University: we are 
only now beginning to learn how to protect economic, social and cultural rights as 
rights and not as aspirations, on a par with the quite effective means the movement 
has developed for civil and political rights.  And the principle of equality and non-
discrimination is becoming central to the movement in ways in which it just wasn’t 
until recently, especially with the emergence of communities claiming their 
rightful place among rights-bearers: women, racial and religious minorities, 
original peoples, those discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation, 
persons with disabilities and the victims of discrimination on other bases.  My 
reason to concentrate on prevention of genocide and on transitional justice reflects 
the work that I have been engaged in most recently.  As we learn how to realize 
justice in times of transition and how to prevent recurrence of mass atrocity, we 
also learn to incorporate the rights, the wishes and the interests of powerless 
communities, and we learn from them what it will take to remove the ultimate 
causes of their powerlessness and their victimization. 
 
The creation and the work of the Nuremberg Court were essential for the 
development of international accountability mechanisms for genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. When, at the end of World War II, the Allied Powers 
adopted the Charter of the International Military Tribunal the newly coined term of 
genocide was used for the first time in the Nuremberg indictment of 18 October 
1945.  In 1946, the General Assembly affirmed the principles of international law 
recognized by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal and, thereby 
implicitly confirmed that genocide was a crime under international law. Two years 
later, on 9 December 1948, the General Assembly adopted the Convention on the 
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Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in which the parties confirm 
that genocide is a crime under international law, which they undertake to prevent 
and punish.  One day after that, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 
enacted.  Almost sixty years later, we need periodically to ratify the idea that there 
are crimes so heinous and so offensive to the conscience of humanity that they 
simply cannot go unpunished, no matter what justification is alleged for their 
impunity.  
 
The Genocide Convention focuses more directly on punishment than on 
prevention, although clearly the punishment of the crime of genocide is meant to 
have a general preventive effect. In addition, some of the acts referred to in article 
3 of the Convention have a preventive dimension, such as the obligation to 
prosecute conspiracy, attempted genocide and public incitement to commit 
genocide. Another preventive element can be found in article 8, which provides for 
the possibility of any contracting party to call upon the competent organs of the 
United Nations to take action on the prevention or repression of acts of genocide.  
 
Since the Holocaust served as the most deliberate and thorough example during 
discussions about the Convention, the text reflects the historic experience of the 
difficulties in prosecuting and punishing acts of genocide within the State where 
they are committed, during the time the genocide occurs or is about to happen. In 
most cases in history, the government, its agents and the population participated in 
these acts or, at least, stood silently by while others committed genocide.  Impunity 
for those crimes was an important element contributing to an atmosphere of fear 
that disabled the formal and informal mechanisms of accountability within the 
society in question. Therefore, the Convention calls for the prosecution and 
punishment of perpetrators of genocide in third countries or before an international 
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criminal court.  Incidentally, though the term “transitional justice” might indicate 
that the mechanisms of truth-seeking, prosecutions, reparations, institutional 
reform and reconciliation are only triggered when a real transition from 
dictatorship to democracy or from conflict to peace actually begins.  In fact, we at 
ICTJ find ourselves increasingly drawn to act while violations are ongoing, or 
when there is a chance for peace, and the terms to be negotiated inevitably raise the 
question of how much justice are we all willing to give up for the sake of peace. 
 
According to the International Court of Justice the Convention primarily confirms 
pre-existing legal obligations that amount to international jus cogens. Thus, 
punishing and preventing genocide is a principle of international law so 
fundamental that no nation may ignore it. Governments are obliged to take all 
measures within their power to prevent the commission of the crime of genocide, 
even before a competent court determines that the Convention actually applies to a 
case at hand.  
 
Notwithstanding the existing legal obligation to prevent genocide, numerous cases 
of massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law occurred since the 
adoption of the 1948 Convention without triggering action as described in article 8 
of its text and without even eliciting action by Member States. In hindsight, the 
United Nations, Member States and NGOs have concluded that many of these 
situations could have been anticipated and prevented.  
 
On 7 April 2004, in his address to the Human Rights Commission at the occasion 
of a special meeting to observe the International Day of Reflection on the 1994 
Genocide in Rwanda, the Secretary-General pointed to conspicuous gaps in the 
United Nations’ capacity to give early warning of genocide or comparable crimes. 
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At the same time, he launched an Action Plan to Prevent Genocide, which included 
the development of a capacity within the United Nations system for early and clear 
warning of potential genocide.  In this respect, the Secretary-General announced 
his decision to create a new post of Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, 
reporting through his Office to the Security Council.   
 
 
The purpose of the Special Adviser is not to determine whether genocide has 
occurred or is occurring, but to propose steps to prevent it. The last paragraph of 
the outline of the mandate states clearly that “the Special Adviser would not make 
a determination on whether genocide within the meaning of the Convention had 
occurred.”  This limitation is not a reflection of political sensitivities but a practical 
one deriving from the preventive character of the mandate.  The role of the SAPG 
is to provide early warning before all the elements that constitute the definition of 
genocide under the Convention are present and to suggest appropriate action.  
 
Beyond the matter of the terms of reference the SAPG is expected to follow, it is 
wise to move away from the need to make a prior determination that a certain set 
of atrocities constitutes genocide before we decide to act.  Too often the debate 
over whether genocide is occurring has become more important than taking action 
to reverse the situation and prevent further violations.  Both legally and morally, 
our obligation to protect populations at risk is triggered not only by genocide, but 
also by crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
  
The mandate of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide involves 
gathering information, providing early warning and presenting appropriate 
recommendations to prevent genocide from occurring.  To this end, the functions 
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as outlined to the Security Council involve: (1) Collecting existing information, in 
particular from within the UN system, on massive and serious violations of human 
rights and international humanitarian law of ethnic and racial origin that, if not 
prevented or halted, might lead to genocide; (2) Acting as an early-warning 
mechanism to the Secretary-General, and, through him to the Security Council, by 
bringing to the latter’s attention potential situations that could result in genocide; 
(3) Making recommendations to the Security Council through the Secretary-
General, on actions to prevent or halt genocide; and (4) Liaising with the UN 
system on activities for the prevention of genocide and working to enhance the UN 
capacity to analyze and manage information relating to genocide and related 
crimes.  
 
Prevention of genocide requires both early warning and early action.  Early 
warning should always be accompanied by practical proposals and 
recommendations that enable the international community to act in a timely 
fashion.  Both in the short and long term, the prevention of genocide seems 
predicated on acting comprehensively, as early as possible, in four interrelated 
areas: the protection of civilians, establishing accountability for violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law, humanitarian relief, and steps to settle 
underlying conflicts through peace agreements.  
 
Let me concentrate more specifically on accountability.  Accountability in the form 
of punishment for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes is crucial to 
prevention of similar acts in the future. The sense of impunity for the crimes 
already committed breeds insecurity among populations at risk and creates an 
incentive for repetition among the perpetrators.  This insecurity in turn complicates 
the task of protecting civilian population at risk, increases the difficulty of 
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providing humanitarian relief, and ultimately makes peace negotiations uncertain.  
That is why, in case after case, during my tenure I found myself arguing in favor of 
measures to break the cycle of impunity: early on I urged the Security Council to 
refer the Darfur case to the International Criminal Court, which finally happened 
on April 1, 2005.  In late 2004, in the midst of a frenzy of hate speech in Cote 
d’Ivoire, I reminded all actors that the ICC has jurisdiction over the country and 
that instigation and incitement to commit crimes under the Statute of Rome could 
indeed trigger an eventual indictment. 
 
Breaking the cycle of impunity is greatly aided by the existence of an institution 
like the permanent International Criminal Court.  However, we must realize that in 
the best case scenario the ICC will only prosecute and punish a handful of those 
bearing the highest responsibility for the crimes.  It is important, therefore, to press 
the domestic judicial authorities to assume their responsibilities, and for 
government and civil society to contribute efforts towards a comprehensive set of 
policy prescriptions that will meet everybody’s expectations of justice and do so 
with respect for international standards of fair trial and due process.  This is where 
the mechanisms of transitional justice can serve to bridge the otherwise inevitable 
“impunity gap” that will develop between what the international community can 
accomplish and the expectations we raise among victims. 
 
National and international initiatives to address impunity for genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, including the Nuremberg Court, the Rwanda 
Tribunal and the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia have also been key to help 
advance the fight against impunity and, in the process, provide important elements 
for prevention. In their decisions, these Courts have clarified legal terms, 
established historic accounts of events, identified indicators for early-warning and, 
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indirectly, revealed opportunities for preventive action that were missed in the past. 
A systematic review of court decisions to analyze their contribution to the 
prevention of genocide is still outstanding. I am confident that the work of the 
International Criminal Court will be an important contribution in this regard.   
 
In the meantime, there is no doubt that the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect and 
its rapid emergence as a norm of international relations has provided a large 
measure of legitimacy and recognition to the Office of the Special Advisor on the 
Prevention of Genocide.  The inclusion of RtoP in the Summit Outcome document 
approved by the consensus of 191 heads of state and government in September 
2005, and the resolution to the same effect passed later by the Security Council go 
a long way towards validating efforts to prevent genocide.  It must be noted, 
however, that we still need – urgently – to move from the expression of 
commitment and principle, to the effective implementation of the rule in specific 
situations. 
 
Accountability and international norms are important, and so are early warning 
based on accurate information and reasonable, practical suggestions for action.  
But in all recent cases of genocide or genocide-like situations what has been 
missing is the political will to act.  Experience shows that political will never exists 
in a vacuum and never appears spontaneously; it is constructed over time by 
dedicated individuals and organizations of civil society whose mobilization 
eventually forces leaders to reckon with the problem.  In that sense, raising public 
concern remains a crucial element for effective genocide prevention. In an analysis 
of the past reactions of United States governments to situations of massive 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, Samantha Power 
has pointed to the indispensable role of public opinion in providing the motivation 
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and creating the political will to address crimes of genocide abroad. The same is 
true, for sure, for other governments. There have always been early signs of a 
deteriorating situation, some concrete proposals for preventive action and some 
degree of public concern. However, history has shown that governments 
intervened when urged to do so by their citizens.  The leadership of national and 
international civil society organizations as well as of influential, respected 
individuals cannot be overstated.  For that reason, Secretary General Kofi Annan  
instructed me to act also as a public spokesman whenever I thought that public 
advocacy would save more lives than quiet diplomacy.  My successor has proven 
talents and experience as a public advocate and we can all be confident that he will 
contribute very effectively to shaping and mobilizing public opinion so that 
eventually the member States of the United Nations decide to implement their 
obligations under the Genocide Convention and the emerging norm of 
Responsibility to Protect. 
 
Thank you. 
 
 
 
 
